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Social Service Vouchers: Issues
for Social Work Practice
MICHAEL D. PARKER
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
School of Social Work
The current political climate has created renewed interest in vouchers
as a method to finance and deliver human service programs. After ex-
plaining voucher theory and reviewing major voucher programs and
experiments, this article discusses potential consequences of social ser-
vice vouchers by identifying issues that are of concern to social work
and related professions.
Vouchers are certificates or coupons, given by a govern-
ment agency to eligible individuals, which can be used like
money to purchase specific goods or services. The coupons have
a cash value and can be spent at any authorized supplier-
public or private-selected by the voucherholder. The supplier
then redeems the vouchers at the funding agency. A popu-
lar example of vouchers is the Food Stamp Program. For in-
stance, food stamp recipients are issued coupons (vouchers)
giving them, in effect, money for food items. Recipients can
spend their "voucher" at any approved retail store they choose.
The retailer then exchanges the foodstamps for cash.
Vouchers are frequently recommended as a way to finance
and deliver human service programs. Since the 1960s, vouch-
ers have been used by federal, state, and local governments to
provide a variety of services including nutrition, housing, edu-
cation, child care, recreation, health care, and legal services. Po-
litical agendas, especially on the conservative right, increasingly
include vouchers as a method to finance and deliver services
(Friedman, 1980; Savas, 1982). Yet, the use of vouchers is one
of the least understood welfare reform proposals. The results of
voucher experiments have done little to reassure the viability
of this approach and there is considerable discussion about the
usefulness of vouchers (Crompton, 1983; Wynne, 1986; Raywid,
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1987; Stoesz, 1988; Parker, 1989). If social workers and other
human service professionals are to contribute to the debate on
vouchers, and influence policy decisions on voucher proposals,
they must be knowledgeable about and involved in the issues.
To that end, this article explains voucher theory, reviews results
and lessons from major voucher programs, and explores funda-
mental issues that should be examined by social workers and
related professionals.
Understanding Vouchers
In order to understand vouchers, it is helpful to examine its
theoretical basis, which comes from classical economic theory.
Simply stated, social service vouchers will shift human service
programs into the open market and expose them to the pres-
sures of supply and demand. The expectation is that vouchers
redistribute economic power between clients and agencies by
giving subsidies directly to users rather than to providers. This
changes the funding scheme from a supply subsidy to a de-
mand subsidy.
Voucher advocates believe that open markets give clients
more choice in selecting services and promote competition
among human service providers. Vouchers allow clients to seek
out and purchase services from the human service professional
they judge to be best for their needs. In theory, providers at-
tempt to offer services, at a competitive price, and of the type
and quality desired by clients. Providers who attract the most
clients receive the most vouchers and, hence, the most finan-
cial resources. In contrast, providers who attract fewer clients
receive fewer resources.
A basic assumption of voucher theory is that increased client
choice and expanded competition bring positive changes to the
marketplace which, when applied to social service markets,
compel the welfare system to improve. Expected benefits from
social service vouchers include: improvements in the price, sup-
ply, and quality of social services; increased innovation and
diversity in welfare programming; greater program efficiency
and accountability; and increased client satisfaction (Friedman,
1962, 1980; Reid, 1972).
Vouchers
Because few rigorous experiments have been conducted to
evaluate the effects of vouchers on human service programs,
proponents of vouchers look to economic theory to support
their claims. As a result, there is a wide gap between theoretical
models of vouchers and their proven value under actual service
conditions. In the absence of scientific evidence, decisions to use
vouchers have turned on theoretical and ideological speculation.
Current Voucher Programs
The G.I. Bill, the Food Stamp Program, and Medicare are
major institutionalized voucher programs administered by the
federal government. The starting point for gaining practical
understanding of vouchers is to review the results of these
programs.
The G.I. Bill
An early and very popular government voucher program
is the G.I. Bill's education program of the Servicemen's Read-
justment Act of 1944. Designed to help veterans and service
personnel to a college education or to vocational training with
tuition, fees, books, and supplies paid by the government. Un-
der the terms of the G.I. Bill, eligible veterans are given a re-
source allocation for educational services which can be spent
at any approved school they choose. The Veteran's Administra-
tion (VA) then reimburses the educational institution. In effect,
the allotment is a voucher. By most accounts, the education
provisions of the G.I. Bill have helped millions of veterans to
successfully adjust to civilian life (Olson, 1974; Mosch, 1975;
Hyman, 1986).
It is important to note that a major function of vouchers
is to encourage the consumption of particular goods or ser-
vices by a particular subgroup of consumers. Although over
eight million veterans have used their education benefits (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1990), a study by Norman Frederik-
son and William Schrader (cited in Olson, 1974) indicates that
91.6% of the veterans would have attended college without the
G.I. Bill. Put another way, the G.I. Bill increased veteran enroll-
ment in educational institutions by a relatively small fraction
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(9.4%)-although it undoubtedly eased the financial burdens of
the veterans who attended college. The results of this study sug-
gest that vouchers by themselves will not significantly increase
the consumption of a particular good or service.
It is also worth noting that another purpose of vouchers
is to improve program efficiency. Early reports show that, in
an effort to increase revenues, some schools took advantage
of the G.I. Bill by raising tuition, collecting nonresident tu-
ition from veterans, falsifying attendance records or failing to
inform the VA when veterans registered but did not attend
classes (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 1952; Yoder, 1963; Frederikson and Schrader, cited in
Olson, 1974). Other fraudulent practices included establishing
"diploma mills" and other profit-making schools of doubtful
value to obtain funds from the government (Yoder, 1963). To
check waste and inefficiency, Congress has passed a series of
restrictive amendments to the original bill. Apparently, vouch-
ers alone do not guarantee programs will operate efficiently and
safeguards must be provided to ensure against abuse.
During the 1960s and 1970s, higher education was charac-
terized by "bigness." To meet increased enrollment demands,
influenced by the influx of G.I. Bill students, educators and
legislators relied on larger schools and crowded classrooms. Ac-
cording to Olson (1974), many veterans complained of receiving
a lower quality education due to "assembly line operations in
the classroom...and the increased pressure to make education
an impersonal affair" (p. 104). The G.I. Bill experience also in-
dicates that vouchers do not effectively improve the quality of
a particular service.
The Food Stamp Program
Created in 1964, the Food Stamp Program is one of the most
widely recognized government voucher programs. The objec-
tive of the program is to increase food purchases and raise
the levels of nutrition among low-income households. Eligi-
ble households are entitled to monthly food stamp allotments
(vouchers) which can be spent on food items in any approved
retail store they choose. The stores turn in their food stamps to
the United States Department of Agriculture for cash. In 1988,
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there were 18.6 million participants in the program (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 1990). Referring to its size, Levitan (1985)
believes the Food Stamp Program has been successful in target-
ing benefits to those most in need and offering assistance to the
working poor.
Several evaluative studies of the Food Stamp Program have
been conducted to determine how well it is meeting its primary
objectives. In two major studies, William Clarkson (1975) and
Maurice MacDonald (1976) conclude that food stamps failed
to achieve the objectives of increased food purchases and im-
proved diets among the poor. Instead, the program increased
the general purchasing power of participating households by
replacing cash expenditures formerly made for food thereby,
making money that would normally be spent on food avail-
able for other uses. Clarkson also found that the cash equivalent
value of food stamps is 82% of the actual market value. In other
words, participating households would have been as satisfied
with $82 in a cash transfer as with $100 in foodstamps. These au-
thors conclude that the Food Stamp Program is both inefficient
and ineffective, and would be better replaced with a system of
cash payments.
A recent study by Thomas Fraker, Barbara Devaney and
Edward Cavin (1986) supports this recommendation. The au-
thors looked at a pilot project in Puerto Rico where eligible
households received cash grants instead of food stamps. The
results indicated that the cashing out of foodstamps had no
detectable effect on total food expenditures of participating fam-
ilies. Whether these results would extend to the U.S. Food Stamp
Program remains to be determined.
The significance of the Food Stamp Program studies, as a
representation of vouchers, is that they provide added evidence
that vouchers alone do not significantly increase consumption of
a particular good or service. This is due in part because vouch-
ers are treated as income supplements by recipients thereby
increasing their purchasing power for nonvoucher items. An-
other finding is that vouchers are inefficient because they are
not cash equivalent. The voucherholders' subjective evaluation
of vouchers may be below their actual purchasing power be-
cause they must be spent on particular goods or services. This
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indicates that restricted subsidies (vouchers) are more costly
than unrestricted subsidies (cash).
The Medicare Program
The largest federally administered program with voucher
characteristics is Medicare. Enacted in 1964, the Medicare Pro-
gram provides health insurance protection for the aged and
disabled. Its primary goal is to increase access to health care
services and to reduce the financial burden of the high costs of
medical care. Under the terms of the program, Medicare recip-
ients are issued an enrollment card (voucher) giving them, in
effect, money for medical services. Cardholders can spend their
"voucher" at any authorized health care provider they choose.
The provider then bills the federal government for payment.
There is no doubt that the Medicare Program has done much
to extend health care coverage to virtually all elderly and dis-
abled Americans. In 1988, Medicare served 32.9 million elderly
and disabled citizens (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990).
The program also receives consistent public support, with more
than 90% of those surveyed agreeing with Medicare's purposes
and policy goals (Dobson, Lagenbrunner, Pelovitz, and Willis,
1986). Moreover, studies confirm that the health of the elderly
improved after the program's introduction (Lowenstein, 1971;
Rosenwaike, Yaffe, and Sagi, 1980).
Voucher proponents argue that, through the power of com-
petition, goods and services will be provided at the lowest
possible cost. This is because voucher users are motivated to
shop wisely so their vouchers will go further and they can buy
more. And, providers have incentives to reduce or contain costs
in order to capture a larger share of the market.
Since Medicare's inception, a major issue in the development
of the program has been cost containment. Medicare expendi-
tures have increased at an annual rate of 17.7% from 1970 to
1982 (Davis and Rowland, 1986), well ahead of the general rate
of inflation. In 1988, Medicare spending reached $86.3 billion
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990). As a result of rising pro-
gram costs there has been mounting pressure at the Federal
level to regulate the health care market.
Vouchers
The Medicare experience indicates that vouchers failed to
establish reasonable costs through market forces. Therefore, in
an effort to bring health care costs under control, the federal
government has developed policies to promote cost effective-
ness and cost containment. It is important to note, however,
that because of its reimbursement system the Medicare Pro-
gram is not as good a voucher system as the G.I. Bill or the
Food Stamp Program. Medicare operates by paying physicians
on a fee-for-service basis according to a customary, prevailing,
and reasonable charge method and paying hospitals on a ret-
rospective basis according to their costs. (Effective October 1,
1983, payment rates for hospitals are prospectively determined
on a case basis. The Medicare hospital prospective payment
system (PPS) uses diagnosis-related groups (DRG's) to clas-
sify cases for payment.) Since reimbursement rates are fixed,
there is no incentive for the beneficiary to seek out a low-cost,
good quality health care provider. If a person finds a provider
who charges less than the maximum, the savings will go to the
federal government not the consumer. (Under the PPS plan, ac-
crued savings will go the hospital.) Because these conditions
threaten the integrity of vouchers, evidence from the Medicare
Program should not be considered conclusive.
Past Experiments with Social Service Vouchers
In addition to the programs discussed above, social experi-
ments with vouchers have been conducted, for the most part, in
three service areas-education, housing, and child day care. It
is helpful to look at major studies in each of these areas as they
pertain to expected benefits of social service voucher systems.
Education Vouchers
Vouchers have a long history in education, where the con-
cept is generally traced back to Adam Smith and Thomas Paine.
Smith and Paine emphasized familial responsibility for the kind
of education children receive. In the same tradition, recent pro-
posals for education voucher plans have been made by Mil-
ton Friedman (1962, 1980), Christopher Jencks (1970), and John
Coons and Stephen Sugerman (1978). In 1985, the Reagan
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Administration introduced the Equity and Choice Act (TEACH).
Although not enacted into law, the bill called for education
vouchers for low-income families. A 1987 Gallop education sur-
vey found that parents favor a voucher system-44% for to 41%
against-and 71% support the principle of school choice. The
Bush Administration is reviving the voucher strategy for public
school reform by promoting the notion of "educational choice."
Between 1972 and 1975, a modified voucher plan was tested
in the San Jose, California, Alum Rock Elementary School Dis-
trict. Parents received vouchers equal to their child's fair share
of public education funds and were allowed to select the school
and programs of their choice. The intent of the experiment was
to allow greater parent choice than before in choosing schools
and to encourage competition among schools. However, the the-
oretical benefits from this voucher scheme were not realized. On
the matter of choice, few parents "shopped around" for schools.
Instead, most made their selection based on geographic prox-
imity and sent their children to the nearest school. While the
experiment did yield a range of educational alternatives from
which parents could choose, most favored traditional curricula.
After evaluating the experiment, the Rand Corporation (1981)
concluded that, at best, overall effects of vouchers were negli-
gible, and, at worst, vouchers worked in a direction opposite
from theoretical expectations.
However, the Alum Rock experiment did shed some light
on social service voucher issues (Lindelow, 1979). The evidence
indicates that it is difficult to create a competitive market within
an established human service system in part due to the mo-
nopoly structure of human service agencies. Monopoly implies
exclusive control over the market and monopolists do not will-
ingly yield their power. Another insight from this experiment,
is that educators do not like competition; they prefer to exercise
professional judgment on curriculum issues rather than respond
to market forces. Finally, family choice may increase social strat-
ification between white-collar and working-class families. In the
Alum Rock experiment, wealthier families chose more innova-
tive programs for their children, while working-class and mi-
nority families selected more traditional educational programs.
Vouchers
Housing Vouchers
Housing vouchers have been recommended at various times
since 1935. The most recent effort was in 1985 when the Rea-
gan Administration persuaded Congress to approve a one bil-
lion dollar, five-year demonstration program in 20 urban areas
across the country. This experimental program uses rent vouch-
ers as a way to shift federal housing policy away from con-
struction (supply) subsidies and toward consumer (demand)
subsidies. The program assumes that the housing problem is
one of affordability not availability and helps the poor rent re-
habilitated homes.
Evaluations of this program are not yet published, how-
ever, preliminary reports point to several problems (DePalma,
1987). In New York City most vouchers are returned because
the holder cannot find an affordable apartment-high rents and
low vacancy rates negate any advantages of a voucher, indicat-
ing that the affordable housing supply is not expanding due to
vouchers. In some demonstration areas, vouchers are unused
because they do not offer as much assistance as existing federal
subsidies. Other reports indicate that, on average, the renter's
share of rent is higher in the voucher program while the qual-
ity of housing is unchanged. It appears that, in some cities,
vouchers have a negative effect on the price of housing and no
effect on the overall quality of living arrangements. Despite ef-
forts from the White House, Congress has consistently refused
to expand the housing voucher program.
In 1970, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment launched one of the most rigorous voucher experiments to
date-the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP).
Conducted over an 11 year period, EHAP covered 30,000 low-
income households in 12 sites across the country. A central
objective of the study was to assess the impact of voucher subsi-
dies on patterns of housing consumption. Unlike vouchers that
can be spent only for specific services, e.g., food and education,
housing allowances could be spent in any way. However, eligi-
bility requirements were established to help channel allowances
towards housing consumption.
One significant finding from the EHAP study is that most
participants did not use vouchers to increase housing-related
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purchases-most housing allowance payments were spent on
nonhousing items such as clothing and recreation (Struyk and
Bendick, 1981). In effect, the voucher plan became an income
supplement, increasing the households' disposal income while
leaving the housing arrangement unchanged. Put simply, the
quality of housing was not improved through the use of vouch-
ers. Another finding, one that has important implications for
social service vouchers, is that individuals generally partici-
pate in a voucher program based upon a rational assessment
of the benefits and costs to them in doing so. For instance,
potential users must evaluate whether receiving the vouchers
increases their well-being sufficiently to compensate for meeting
the requirements of the program. Also, the greater the perceived
transaction costs imposed by the program, such as time and
trouble spent searching for information and shopping for mar-
ket alternatives, the less the vouchers will be valued by the user.
A fair assessment is that high costs, as perceived by potential
users, are a disincentive for eligible clients to participate in this
type of program.
Child Day Care Vouchers
Since the early 1970s, Florida, California, Minnesota, and
Texas have tested child day care vouchers (Kahn and Kammer-
man, 1987). In 1987-88, five bills were introduced in Congress
that contained voucher proposals for child day care (The Bureau
of National Affairs, 1988). The Choices for Children Act of 1989,
which incorporates vouchers into child day care, was also in-
troduced in Congress. Although the bill was looked at by both
the House and Senate, no action was taken. These legislative
developments indicate that the voucher idea has considerable
support as a policy option for development of a national child
day care system.
In 1982, the Arizona Department of Economic Security
(ADES) implemented a three-year pilot child day care voucher
program. In the test area, low-income families received state
vouchers which could be used to purchase day care services
from any licensed or certified provider selected by the parents.
By offering families a greater degree of choice and responsi-
bility in selecting services and promoting competition among
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providers, it was anticipated that the price, supply, and quality
of child day care would improve.
An evaluative study of the ADES child day care voucher
program failed to provide evidence of the worth of day care
vouchers (Parker, 1989). With regard to price, results indicate
that, on average, voucher families paid more than nonvoucher
families for comparable day care services-suggesting that a so-
cial service voucher system might bring about higher prices for
many clients, w'th the poorest of the poor being at greatest risk.
On the issue of supply, there was no evidence of a beneficial
effect on the supply of day care available to voucher users-
calling into question the economic efficiency of a social service
voucher system. Finally, there was no indication that the quality
of day care was improved by the voucher program-suggesting
that a voucher program by itself does not improve the quality
of social service programs. In conclusion, vouchers had a neg-
ligible, if not negative, effect on the price, supply, and quality
of child day care in the pilot area.
Discussion
Any major change in the way human service programs are
financed and delivered is certain to have consequences for social
agencies, human service professionals, and their clients. There-
fore, it is important for social workers and related professionals
to examine the potential consequences of vouchers so that they
can determine whether to support it, modify it, or accommo-
date to it. To better understand the important implications of
vouchers, key issues are addressed below. These issues can
be placed in three interrelated categories critical to economic
theory-competition, information, and regulation.
Competition
Competition is a fundamental concept of classical econom-
ics. Theoretically, in a competitive market, consumers determine
the allocation of resources by virtue of their demand and sup-
pliers provide the goods and services consumers want, in the
largest quantity, at the lowest possible price. It follows from this,
according to voucher advocates, that encouraging competition
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among human service agencies will produce similar results in
social service markets.
In the past, the human service professions took pains to
distance themselves from the competitive marketplace. The so-
cial work profession was largely successful in this regard and
a set of values and behaviors emerged to guide the practice
of its members. The resulting problem is that the interests of
competition run counter to many strongly held professional val-
ues and behaviors. For instance, social workers tend to view
other members of the profession as colleagues working toward
a common end-not competitors. The profession promotes the
concept of dedicated service for its own sake-not for economic
gain or self-interest. Furthermore, there is also a general reluc-
tance to participate in most forms of self-promotion and adver-
tising among professional social workers.
A possible shift to vouchers raises key questions that must
be explored before a competitive market strategy can be intro-
duced into the human services. For example, will resources be
allocated to the most persuasive rather than the most skilled
provider? Will marketing skills become more important than
professional skills in delivering services? Will name recognition
and image become more important than substance? Will contro-
versial and less popular services, such as working with AIDS
patients or methadone counseling, be offered at all? How will
less visible and frequently underserved clients, such as the rural
poor and homeless families and children get the help they need?
Finally, in a competitive market, will the general human service
community become segmented, factional, and self-serving?
In sum, the voucher strategy of creating a competitive social
service market, strikes directly at basic features of the human
service system as it currently exists. At a minimum, a fully
competitive human service system would result in a major re-
ordering of relationships between human service professionals
and their clients, with large implications for both human service
organizations and the social work profession.
Information
The market system assumes that individuals are rational
consumers and possess sufficient information to make intelli-
Vouchers
gent choices relevant to their needs. Obviously, without cor-
rect or adequate information individuals cannot make optimal
choices. Following this line of thinking, if a social service vouch-
er system is to be effective, clients must be well informed about
the market.
Therein lies a problem. Traditional human service clients are
disproportionately information-poor. Potential users of social
service voucher programs include the ill-educated, the poor, the
physically handicapped, and mentally disabled, the aged, the
very young, and other disadvantaged individuals and families
whose conditions or circumstances impede access to ordinary
consumer information or complicate their ability to use infor-
mation. This problem should be of greater-than-normal con-
cern in a social service market for unlike other market goods,
such as grocery items, human services cannot be easily com-
pared, and the consequences for a bad choice are often more
severe.
It should not be concluded from this discussion that all
human service markets offer meaningful choice to consumers.
Rural markets, for example, offer little in the way of consumer
choice. Given the fundamental economic law of supply and de-
mand, there is no reason to believe that vouchers will increase
the range of choices in small human service markets.
Although access to information is vital to the success of
vouchers the subject has received scant attention. There are
many unanswered questions. For example, how can potential
users be assured of having all the information they need to
select the appropriate provider? What information is appropri-
ate? Will human service agencies have to disclose information
regarding their "success rate", their treatment methods, qual-
ifications of their workers and fees? How will information be
made available to potential users? What measures will be taken
to accommodate potential users who do not have the ability to
make sound evaluations about alternative programs?
There is no doubt that voucher plans will require clients to
evaluate human service agencies largely on the basis of their
own observations and judgement. This clearly changes the pri-
mary role of individuals seeking help from clients to active
selectors of human services. Under these circumstances, a social
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service voucher system will empower and benefit the best in-
formed consumer, but not necessarily the neediest client.
Regulation
According to classical economic theory, a competitive mar-
ket will be self-regulating. That is, through free choice and intel-
ligent purchasing, consumers maintain high standards of service
by selecting superior programs over inferior ones. It follows that
social service voucher plans would limit the regulatory power
of government agencies by weakening their control over human
service programs.
In a social service market, regulations represent society's
concern for protecting the welfare of children, the elderly, the
mentally and physically disabled, and other groups who are un-
able to safeguard their own welfare. The necessity for regulating
human service programs is also apparent when one considers
that human service users are frequently under emotional or en-
vironmental stresses that interfere with their ability to make
rational decisions that are in their best interest. These conditions
make them particularly susceptible to fraudulent practices and
hucksterism that might take place in unregulated markets.
Before vouchers can be used on a large scale, without regu-
lations, several key questions must be considered. For instance,
will the market give genuine protection to all those whose wel-
fare is at stake? Will the market provide what the community
regards as desirable standards? How will the market guard
against bias or caprice on the part of the community? Will
deregulation lead to abuses by dishonest providers? How will
defiance of standards be handled? Who will invoke authority in
an unregulated market? How will standards be uniformly en-
forced from location to location and at different points in time as
standards change? Will deregulation deflect political and social
pressures that should properly be dealt with by a law-making
body? Is it reasonable to expect standards to be maintained by
the power of consumer choice?
Decisions on these issues should not be made arbitrarily on
the basis of consumers' subjective judgement. To do so would
result in uneven standards from program to program and from
community to community, and open the door to lower-quality
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human services. In order to establish standards that provide
special protections to human service consumers and ensure
quality and stability in service delivery, expert and specialized
knowledge are required.
Conclusion
In recent years, the human service environment has been
characterized by fiscal uncertainty, increased concern for ac-
countability, a trend toward contracting out, and an emphasis
on privatization. In this environment it seems likely that vouch-
ers will continue to be recommended as a finance mechanism
and delivery system. Unfortunately, many important questions
remain unanswered. Therefore, decisions to use vouchers will
continue to turn on theoretical speculation rather than on sci-
entific evidence. Perhaps, questions such as those raised in this
discussion will eventually generate research to guide policy for-
mulation. Until then, social workers and other human service
professionals must be aware of the risks that accompany the use
of social service vouchers and urge policy makers to approach
the idea with caution.
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